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JURORS AS STATUTORY INTERPRETERS
LAWRENCE M. SOLAN*
INTRODUCTION
This Article examines how aspects of the jury system combine to
produce both important strengths and embarrassing weaknesses in
the process of adjudication, especially in criminal cases. In the
United States, criminal law is entirely statutory: there are no
common-law crimes.' At least in principle, it is up to the court to
decide as a legal matter whether particular conduct falls within a
statute's prohibitions. All the jury need do, again in principle, is to
decide whether the government has proven beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant did all of the things that make up the
various elements of the crime.
This was not always so. From the time of the country's founding
until the end of the nineteenth century, criminal juries were responsi-
ble for determining the law as well as for finding the facts.2 The
practice was considered an important part of the structure of democ-
ratic government, dating back to seventeenth-century England.3
During the colonial period of American history, it took on special
significance. One way to make sure that the English government did
not subject the colonists to oppressive laws was to continue the
common-law tradition of placing twelve citizens as a buffer between
* Professor of Law and Director, Center for the Study of Law, Language and Cognition,
Brooklyn Law School; Visiting Fellow, Department of Psychology, Princeton University (Spring
2003). My thanks to John Darley, Catherine Fisk and Nancy Marder for helpful suggestions as
this project has developed. I also wish to thank Marji Molavi and Jerry Steigman for the
valuable contributions as my research assistants. This project was supported by a summer
research grant from-Brooklyn Law School.
1. At least under federal law, this has been true since the early nineteenth century. See
United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812).
2. See Matthew P. Harrington, The Law-Finding Function of the American Jury, 1999 Wls.
L. REV. 377, 377-79; Stephen C. Yeazell, The New Jury and the Ancient Jury Conflict, 1990 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 87.
3. For the history of the development of this doctrine in England, see THOMAS ANDREW
GREEN, VERDICT ACCORDING TO CONSCIENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON THE ENGLISH CRIMINAL
TRIAL JURY 1200-1800, at 153-99 (1985). For an overview of the history, see Irwin A. Horowitz
et al., Jury Nullification: Legal and Psychological Perspectives, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 1207 (2001).
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Parliament and the criminal justice system. What we now call nullifi-
cation was considered an important protection against tyranny.' In
fact, one of the injuries listed in the Declaration of Independence was
deprivation "in many cases, of the benefit of trial by jury."5
Upon the founding of the Republic the practice stood, and was
taken seriously as one of the institutions that protected democratic
values in the context of governmental structure that allowed for little
participation from the citizenry. Alexander Hamilton wrote in The
Federalist:
The friends and adversaries of the plan of the convention, if they
agree in nothing else, concur at least in the value they set upon the
trial by jury; or if there is any difference between them it consists in
this: the former regard it as a valuable safeguard to liberty; the lat-
ter represent it as the very palladium of free government. 6
If the legislature and executive became intoxicated with their own
power and passed oppressive laws, they would still have to get past a
jury to obtain a conviction-no easy feat, it was predicted.7
As judges became more professional and as the value of uniform
treatment by the law grew to overcome concerns about tyranny,
however, the role of the jury shrunk through the first hundred years
of this country's history. By the end of the nineteenth century, judges
were instructing the jury in detail on the law, and jurors were ex-
pected to abide by these instructions. As the Supreme Court put it in
1895, "it is the duty of juries in criminal cases to take the law from the
court and apply that law to the facts. ... -8 Thus ended the jury's
official role as statutory interpreter.
Nonetheless, the maxim that jurors find the facts while judges ar-
ticulate the law is an overstatement. Jurors are not limited to re-
sponding to special verdict questionnaires, which a judge or some
functionary uses to determine whether the law was broken. That may
be true with such matters as adding court costs or interest on to a
judgment, but it does not characterize the main event of the trial
process. Rather, juries enter verdicts, first by finding the facts and
then by determining whether the facts as they found them constitute a
violation of the law. Deciding whether a statute applies to a given set
4. Harrington, supra note 2, at 393.
5. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 20 (U.S. 1776).
6. THE FEDERALIST No. 83 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter, ed. 1999) at 467.
7. See Harrington, supra note 2, at 398-400.
8. Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 102 (1895).
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of facts is what judges do when they interpret statutes, and it is part of
the jury's job as well.
Scholars have taken note of this similarity in function between
judge and jury, especially in the context of jury nullification. Darryl
Brown has suggested that examining the deliberations of nullifying
juries provides evidence that jurors today engage in a great deal of
statutory interpretation, notwithstanding the official story to the
contrary.' Relying on filmed deliberations in a small sample of actual
cases, Brown argues that what may appear superficially to constitute
nullification by jurors of the legal standards they have been instructed
to apply may instead reflect jurors deciding whether guilt in a particu-
lar case would promote the justice values for which the statute was
enacted. Such discussion closely resembles the discourse of statutory
interpretation in which courts and legal academics engage. Brown
proposes a model of practical reasoning to account both for the
decisions that courts make about a statute's applicability under
various circumstances, and the decisions of jurors to convict or acquit.
Approaching the role of the jury from a more historical perspec-
tive, Nancy Marder argues similarly.'0 Marder compares the current
conventional model of the jury with what she calls a process model
and concludes that what is typically seen as nullification may be recast
as jurors participating actively in a system designed to give them
authority to determine that a law is inapplicable in a given situation.
This Article looks more closely at how the legal system deals
with jurors as interpreters of statutes. Judges use a host of tools in
interpreting statutes, many of which are not available to jurors. For
example, to the extent that legislative history is useful in determining
the intent of the legislature, jurors are clearly not the ones to conduct
the relevant analysis. Nonetheless, just as the jury can be seen as an
institution that filters legal proceedings through a "communal sense
of right and wrong" before convicting a person of a crime," some
aspects of statutory interpretation ordinarily performed by judges do
precisely the same thing. Among them are the rule that requires
judges to interpret statutes to avoid absurd results, and the rule that
the words in a statute are to be interpreted according to their ordi-
9. See Darryl K. Brown, Plain Meaning, Practical Reason, and Culpability: Toward a
Theory of Jury Interpretation of Criminal Statutes, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1199 (1998).
10. Nancy S. Marder, The Myth of the Nullifying Jury. 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 877, 879-80
(1999).
11. Yeazell, supra note 2, at 91.
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nary meaning. Each of these canons of construction is designed to
make sure that the substantive law as written does not become so
overreaching as to defeat reasonable goals of justice-just what the
jury is supposed to do.
Moreover, jurors do not enter the jury room as blank slates.
Rather, they perform their duty with a wealth of prior knowledge
about what typically characterizes crimes to which they are exposed
in our culture, whether from newspapers, books, magazines, or
television. Jurors are typically asked in voir dire whether they or
members of their families have been victims of the types of crime for
which the defendant is on trial, but even without such experience
people develop a sense of the characteristics of a prototypical rape,
burglary, robbery, etc. 2 Experimentation shows that it is hard for
people to put these notions aside and to replace them with the
statutory definitions contained in the instructions that the judge reads
to them.13 Judges, in contrast, with their legal training and experi-
ence, may not succumb to precisely the same set of influences as
jurors. This suggests that the jury should be especially suited to
determine a statute's "ordinary meaning" and to decide whether the
defendant's conduct fits within that meaning. 4
In addition, how much interpretation is delegated to jurors de-
pends in large part on how they are instructed. Some instructions
appear to leave a great deal of interpretive discretion to jurors, while
others attempt to control the process with such precision that the
instructions are virtually incomprehensible in their length and detail.
The type of instruction that a jury is likely to hear is, in turn, partly a
function of how the legislature drafted the law that the instruction is
intended to describe. A detailed statute that contains its own glos-
sary, for example, is likely to lead to instructions that reflect this
legislative choice. Statutes drafted more skeletally leave room for
different styles of instruction. The system appears to be ambivalent
about the jury's role in a scheme that purports to seek uniform
treatment through precise and sometimes complex statutory law.
12. Vicki L. Smith, Prototypes in the Courtroom: Lay Representations of Legal Concepts, 61
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 857 (1991).
13. Id.
14. For discussion of how jurors use prototypes, see Dan M. Kahan, Lay Perceptions of
Justice vs. Criminal Law Doctrine: A False Dichotomy?, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 793 (2000). For
an interesting discussion of prototypes in the context of jury nullification, see Katherine T.
Kixmiller, Jury Nullification: A Morally Appropriate Response or a License for Bias? (2001)
(unpublished undergraduate thesis, Princeton University) (on file with author).
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Part I of this Article shows how the trial process leaves jurors
with varying amounts of discretion with respect to the interpretation
of statutes. The system is not of a single mind about this issue.
Nonetheless, instructions often leave jurors with tasks that are very
similar to deciding whether to apply such canons as the ordinary
meaning rule and the absurd result rule, which are used regularly by
appellate judges. Part I illustrates the different attitudes toward
jurors as interpreters of statutes with the federal mail fraud and
money laundering statutes. Some model instructions are short and
leave it to the jury to determine the fit between the facts in the case
and the law, while others are enormously detailed in an effort to
reduce the jury's role to that of fact finder only. This part argues that
more often than not, courts prefer instructions that mimic the lan-
guage of the statute, whether or not this language is comprehensible,
especially when the statute is complex and contains statutory defini-
tions, as many contemporary criminal statutes do. Part III is a brief
conclusion in which different models of the role of judge and jury in
interpreting statutes are explored.
I. MODERN JURORS AS STATUTORY INTERPRETERS
A. How Issues of Statutory Interpretation Arise
Statutory interpretation is traditionally seen as the business of
the court. Judicial statements like the following are commonplace:
"The interpretation of a statute is a question of law which this Court
reviews de novo.' 5 Jurors are not part of this picture. But the lines
are not so clear once one considers how questions of statutory inter-
pretation make their way to the appellate courts that ultimately
decide the questions. One procedural context intended to remove the
jury from the process is a motion to dismiss an indictment or civil
complaint. When a court grants a motion to have the charges
dropped because the statute does not properly apply to the defen-
dant's alleged conduct, the jury never hears the matter. In fact,
taking the case away from the jury is the defense lawyer's goal in
making the motion. But when the defendant loses the motion to
15. King v. Moore, 312 F.3d 1365, 1366 (11th Cir. 2002); see also Lozen Int'l, L.L.C. v. Sea-
Land Serv., Inc., 285 F.3d 808, 813 (9th Cir. 2002); Fritz v. Principi, 264 F.3d 1372, 1374 (Fed.
Cir. 2001).
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dismiss, or never makes such a motion, the case may ultimately go to
trial, and the court decides how to instruct the jury.
At that point, the court has two alternatives. It can simply in-
struct the jury on what the statute says and allow the jurors to decide
whether the facts as established violate the statute, or it can give
specific instructions on the meanings of the statutory terms that
specifically establish a relationship between the evidence in the case
and the statute. In one instance, the jury is given considerable
latitude not only to find the facts, but also to determine whether the
statute covers the facts as the jury found them, the latter of which is
typically regarded as a legal question. In the other, the court attempts
to keep the jury on a "short leash."16 Whichever approach the court
takes, a subsequent appellate opinion that deals with the issue of
statutory interpretation is procedurally about the instructions to the
jury in the case.
Both of these very different approaches to instructing the jury
can be found in the case law on statutory interpretation. Consider
Smith v. United States, 7 a case widely discussed in the literature on
statutory interpretation. There, the defendant was in the process of
trading an unloaded machinegun for some illegal narcotics when he
got cold feet and decided to run. The police caught up with him and
charged him with attempting to use a firearm "during and in relation
to . . . [a] drug trafficking crime."'" A jury convicted Smith, and the
judge sentenced him to the mandatory thirty-year sentence for using a
machine gun during a drug trafficking crime. On appeal, Smith
argued that the trial court should have instructed the jury that use in
trade does not constitute "use" for purposes of the statute.19 The
court of appeals rejected this contention as a matter of statutory
interpretation. The jury was not, however, instructed in the opposite
direction either: that use in trade does constitute "use" for purposes
of the statute. If it had been, the issue would have been raised on
appeal. Rather, at trial it was up to the jury to determine whether
Smith had violated the statute by his conduct. That made jurors
16. The less legalistic, more expansive alternative is more consistent with the traditional
jury. See Nancy S. Marder, Juries and Technology: Equipping Jurors for the Twenty-First
Century, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 1257, 1261 (2001) (suggesting that the jury be given the opportu-
nity to play a more active role in the trial process, consistent with the traditional, more
expanded role of the jury prior to the twentieth century).
17. 508 U.S. 223 (1993).
18. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (1988).
19. United States v. Smith, 957 F.2d 835, 836 n.4 (11th Cir. 1992).
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interpreters of the statute as well as finders of fact. On the other
hand, after the Smith decision, prosecutors may argue that they are
entitled to an instruction that "using" a firearm during a drug traffick-
ing crime includes trading it for illegal drugs.
Smith suggests that jurors play a significant role as statutory in-
terpreters unless and until an appellate court rules in a published
opinion on a particular issue concerning the statute's applicability.
Since there are many issues that are never resolved in that way, jurors
remain statutory interpreters with respect to portions of many stat-
utes. Moreover, even when an appellate court does decide an issue, it
is possible to construe the decision as permitting the jury to find that
the statute applies, rather than as requiring the jury to so find. Even
on the weaker alternative, Smith shows, at least indirectly, that the
juror's role as statutory interpreter has not been entirely eliminated,
notwithstanding the modern rule that statutory interpretation is up to
the court-not the jury.
Now consider, in contrast, another recent statutory interpreta-
tion case, Bryan v. United States, 0 in which a different dynamic
occurred at trial with respect to the role of the jury. In that case, the
defendant was accused of violating the Firearm Owners' Protection
Act"1 by "willfully" dealing in firearms without a license. At issue in
the case was what it means to "willfully" violate the statute. The
defendant asked for an instruction that jurors "must be persuaded
that with the actual knowledge of the federal firearms licensing laws
Defendant acted in knowing and intentional violation of them. ' 22
Instead, the trial judge told the jury that "the person need not be
aware of the specific law or rule that his conduct may be violating.
But he must act with the intent to do something that the law for-
bids. 23
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that knowl-
edge that the defendant was in some manner acting wrongly met the
"willfulness" requirement under the statute. Neither the parties nor
the trial judge considered leaving it to the jury to determine whether
the defendant's state of mind constituted willful violation of the
statute. Now that Bryan has been decided, that approach to inter-
preting the statute is very unlikely to occur in the future.
20. 524 U.S. 184 (1998).
21. 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(1)(D).
22. Bryan, 524 U.S. at 190 n.10.
23. Id. at 190.
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Taken together, these two cases illustrate the uncertainty we con-
tinue to have about the role that jurors should play in the criminal
justice system. In Smith, the Court left a great deal up to the jury. It
was up to the jury to determine what counted as "using a firearm."
But in Bryan, the trial court, urged by both sides, left little to chance,
providing a legal definition for the state of mind requirement. I do
not argue that the court was wrong to do so. There is a substantial
body of law interpreting the mens rea requirements of criminal
statutes, 24 and uniformity in the application of the criminal laws is a
goal worth pursuing. But these cases lead to two very different
pictures of the role that the jury is expected to play in the trial proc-
ess.
B. How Judges and Juries Engage in Statutory Interpretation
1. Jurors as Discoverers of Ordinary Meaning
Statutes are most often seen as directives that force interpreta-
tion from the top-down. They list conditions that must be met for the
statute to apply. Consider, for example, the New Jersey statute that
makes stalking a crime:
A person is guilty of stalking, a crime of the fourth degree, if he
purposefully or knowingly engages in a course of conduct directed
at a specific person that would cause a reasonable person to fear
bodily injury to himself or a member of his immediate family or to
fear the death of himself or a member of his immediate family.25
It is easy enough to divine from the statute the "elements" of
stalking. In other words, the statute is itself a definition of the crime
that sets forth a set of conditions that are individually necessary and
in the aggregate sufficient for stalking to occur. Jury instructions are,
at least on their surface, designed around this structure. Standard
instructions lay out the elements of a crime and tell the jurors that the
government must prove each of the elements beyond a reasonable
doubt.
But sorting out the elements of a crime is not the task that judges
find difficult when they are confronted with problems of statutory
24. For insightful discussion of these terms as used in statutes, see Joseph E. Kennedy,
Making the Crime Fit the Punishment, 51 EMORY L.J. 753 (2002).
25. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:12-10(b) (West Supp. 2003). For further discussion of this
statute, see Lawrence M. Solan, Finding Ordinary Meaning in the Dictionary, in LANGUAGE
AND LAW (M. Robinson ed., forthcoming 2003).
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interpretation. Rather, the problem is almost always a question of
how broadly individual words in a statute should be interpreted. For
example, the stalking statute does not define "course of conduct."
How should the legal system decide when an alleged stalker's actions
meet that requirement?
There are two ways of answering questions about word meaning:
from the top-down, using definitions, and from the bottom-up, based
on everyday experience. Continuing with our example, the statute is
the legislature's definition of stalking, much like a dictionary defini-
tion. But the words within the statute are themselves subject to
definition or to interpretation based on how well they match proto-
typical occurrences based on the experience of the interpreter. Many
psychologists believe that we think both ways: in deciding the circum-
stances in which a concept applies, we look for defining features (i.e.,
features that are necessary or sufficient for the word to be used
appropriately in a given context), and we look for similarity between
the prototypical use of the concept and the situation at hand.26
Judges look at word meaning both ways, sometimes without be-
ing aware of any inconsistency in the structure of the argument. To
illustrate, let us return to Smith.27  Justice O'Connor's majority
opinion focused on the plain meaning of the statute. The law pun-
ishes those who "use a firearm" during a drug-trafficking crime.
Smith used a machine gun, albeit as an object of barter rather than as
a weapon. Therefore, the statute applies to Smith. For authority,
O'Connor relied on a host of dictionaries, among other things. The
holding reflects this approach: "Both a firearm's use as a weapon and
its use as an item of barter fall within the plain language of §
924(c)(1), so long as the use occurs during and in relation to a drug
trafficking offense.... ",28
Interestingly, the majority opinion at one point acknowledges the
importance of context in statutory interpretation: "Language, of
course, cannot be interpreted apart from context. The meaning of a
word that appears ambiguous if viewed in isolation may become clear
26. For some examples of this perspective from the psychological literature, see, for
example, PHILIP N. JOHNSON-LAIRD, MENTAL MODELS (1983); Steven A. Sloman, The
Empirical Case for Two Systems of Reasoning, 119 PSYCHOL. BULL. 3 (1996); Edward E. Smith
et al., Alternative Strategies of Categorization, 65 COGNITION 167 (1998); Edward E. Smith &
Steven A. Sloman, Similarity - Versus Rule-Based Categorization, 22 MEMORY & COGNITION
377 (1994).
27. 508 U.S. 223 (1993).
28. Id. at 240.
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when the word is analyzed in light of the terms that surround it. ' '29
But the majority does little to contextualize its analysis.
Not so according to Justice Scalia's dissent, which opens by stat-
ing the importance of context in construing the words of a statute.
It is, however, a "fundamental principle of statutory construction
(and, indeed, of language itself) that the meaning of a word cannot
be determined in isolation, but must be drawn from the context in
which it is used." That is particularly true of a word as elastic as
"use," whose meanings range all the way from "to partake of" (as
in "he uses tobacco") to "to be wont or accustomed" (as in "he
used to smoke tobacco").3,
Scalia devotes most of his dissent to arguing that the "ordinary
meaning" of the expression "use a firearm" is to use the firearm as a
firearm. Based on one's everyday experience, one would expect the
Congress to have this sense in mind when it enacted the statute.
Scalia notes: "To be sure, 'one can use a firearm in a number of ways,'
... including as an article of exchange, just as one can 'use' a cane as a
hall decoration-but that is not the ordinary meaning of 'using' the
one or the other. ' '31
The tension in Smith, then, is between the top-down "plain
meaning" approach of the majority, and the bottom-up "ordinary
meaning" approach of the dissent.3 2 This is exactly the tension that
characterizes the jury system. In fact, Darryl Brown repeatedly
describes the deliberations of juries that "nullify" as relying upon the
statute's "ordinary meaning."" 3
The experimental literature supports the notion that jurors tend
to concern themselves with the "ordinary meaning" of a statute. In
one set of studies, Vicki Smith presented subjects with the names of a
number of crimes, including assault, burglary, kidnapping, murder,
and robbery, and asked them to list what they considered the most
common characteristics of those crimes. 34  She then presented a
second set of subjects with scenarios of crimes that met the statutory
definitions, but did not contain the prototypical features of the crime.
For example, a ransom demand and youthful victim were the two
most prevalent features of kidnapping, but play no role in the defini-
29. Id. at 229.
30. Id. at 241-42 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 132
(1993)).
31. Id. at 242 (citation omitted).
32. For more detailed discussion of this distinction, see Solan, supra note 25.
33. Brown, supra note 9. at 1263-65.
34. Smith, supra note 12.
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tion of the crime in kidnapping statutes. The results were that the
conviction rates were much higher when the facts contained proto-
typical scenarios than when they contained atypical scenarios, even
though both scenarios fit the statutory definitions without contro-
versy.35
What does this say about the role that jurors play as statutory in-
terpreters in the criminal justice system? Judges are ambivalent
about striking down prosecutions based on facts that fit within a
statute's literal language, but outside of its ordinary meaning. Cer-
tainly they have done so, sometimes in very prominent cases,36 but
often enough, as they did in Smith, judges opt for a broad interpreta-
tion if the statutory language easily enough supports it. Jurors do not
always opt for ordinary usage either, as the guilty verdict in Smith
illustrates. Yet the combination of the two events-trial motions (to
dismiss or to instruct the jury narrowly) and jury deliberation-serve
to keep the application of statutes somewhere within the meanings
that ordinary people would find plausible.
2. Jurors as Discoverers of Absurd Results
By the same token, both judges and jurors engage in analysis un-
der the "absurd result rule." Appellate courts refer to the rule often
in cases involving statutory interpretation.3 7 A classic example is
United States v. Kirby,38 a case decided in 1868. Kirby was a local
sheriff in Kentucky, who had a warrant for the arrest of Farris for
murder. Farris was a letter carrier. Kirby caught up with him while
Farris was delivering the mail on his route and arrested him. In a
postbellum display of federal power, Kirby was himself arrested,
tried, and convicted of interfering with the delivery of the United
States mail. In reversing the conviction, the Supreme Court had this
to say:
35. Id. at 864; see also Brown, supra note 9; Kahan, supra note 14 (for further discussion of
the ramifications).
36. Probably the most famous case of this kind is Church of the Holy Trinity v. United
States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892), in which the Court held that an English minister, brought to the
United States by his congregation, did not count as a person performing "labor" because, while
within the literal meaning of the statute, a member of the clergy is not within the spirit of the
statute.
37. For two recent examples by courts of appeals, see Chapman v. Higbee Co., 319 F.3d
825, 832 (6th Cir. 2003), and Taylor v. Vermont Department of Education, 313 F.3d 768, 779 (2d
Cir. 2002).
38. United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 482 (1868).
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All laws should receive a sensible construction. General terms
should be so limited in their application as not to lead to injustice,
oppression, or an absurd consequence. It will always, therefore, be
presumed that the legislature intended exceptions to its language,
which would avoid results of this character. The reason of the law
in such cases should prevail over its letter.39
The absurd result rule is both stronger and weaker than the ordinary
meaning canon. On the one hand, absurd results need not result from
an excessively broad interpretation of a particular word. In Kirby, it
was the whole situation that made the result indefensible as a fair
dispensation of justice. On the other hand, absurdity is not a very
exacting standard for a system of justice. There may be prosecutions
that a community would regard as disproportionate that do not rise to
the level of absurdity. In fact, Brown discusses jurors making exactly
that point when deliberating in a case in which they regarded the
charges as unfairly harsh.40
It is here that jurors provide defendants with an extra level of
protection beyond that given by appellate courts applying the absurd
result rule. If a prosecution is too aggressive and the defendant is a
sympathetic person, jurors have the right not to convict. Marder
discusses this category of "nullification" in terms of her process model
of the jury.4' The jury serves as a buffer against prosecutors who
attempt to take advantage of linguistic nuances that might put con-
duct within the scope of a statute that was never intended to apply to
a particular situation. Appellate judges are charged with performing
a similar task, but there is no guarantee that their assessment of the fit
between statutory language and ordinary meaning captures the sense
of the community at large. From a linguistic perspective, jurors who
acquit in such cases are merely applying the "ordinary meaning" rule
to entire events, rather than to particular statutory words. 42 In this
sense, jurors are participating in the task of statutory interpretation,
using tools very much like those used by judges.
39. Id. at 486-87.
40. Brown, supra note 9, at 1264-65.
41. Marder, supra note 10, at 879-80.
42. While well beyond the scope of this Article, linguists have argued that language often
treats events as objects. Consider, "Did you see that?" "That" is a pronoun and can refer to
some event that happened outside and was visible through a window even if no one in the
conversation had earlier said anything. For discussion, see RAY JACKENDOFF, FOUNDATIONS
OF LANGUAGE 315-18 (2002); Carol Tenny & James Pustejovsky, A History of Events in
Linguistic Theory, in EVENTS AS GRAMMATICAL OBJECTS: THE CONVERGING PERSPECTIVES
OF LEXICAL SEMANTICS AND SYNTAX 3 (Carol Tenny & James Pustejovsky eds., 2000).
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II. JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND STATUTORY FIDELITY
Let us see how, in typical cases, the system attempts to guide ju-
rors in their task of determining whether a statute applies to the facts
before them. When judges decide whether particular conduct violates
a statute, they engage in minute analysis, looking closely at the
statutory language and at extrinsic sources, such as legislative history,
dictionaries, other sections of the statute, and so on. Jurors have
neither the time nor the resources to do this. In fact, the material that
would allow them to do so is not available to them. Thus, the legal
system must decide what to tell jurors about the law.
Jury instructions are supposed to accomplish this task. But stat-
utes are very difficult to understand. Thus, the system is torn be-
tween promoting fidelity to statutory language and writing
instructions that jurors can follow. Both concerns are clearly visible
in the array of instructions that courts use, with compromises often
apparent within a particular instruction. But the decision about how
to instruct a jury creates higher stakes than that. The more detailed
the instruction, the less the risk, if the jurors indeed follow the
minutia, that jurors will use their everyday experience to reach a
verdict. If every relevant word is defined, and every contingency the
subject of an instruction, then the task of the jury becomes more
mechanical, at least if everything works as designed.43 In this sense,
the decision about how to instruct a jury is at least in part a decision
about how much to leave to the jury the task of interpreting the
statute. Below we see how this dynamic plays out by looking first at
the federal mail fraud statute, which is a relatively short law, and then
at the federal money laundering statute, which is a very long and
complex law designed to leave little to chance. Finally this part of the
Article examines judicial pronouncements concerning the relation-
ship between statutory language and jury instructions.
A. Instructing on Mail Fraud-Presenting the Ideas of a Simple
Statute
The federal mail fraud statute reads in relevant part:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or arti-
fice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of
43. See Kahan, supra note 14; Smith, supra note 12 (showing that it is sometimes very
difficult to dislodge people's prior understanding of a crime and to replace it with the statutory
definition contained in the jury instructions).
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false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises.., for
the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so to
do... knowingly causes to be delivered by mail or such carrier ac-
cording to the direction thereon, or at the place at which it is di-
rected to be delivered by the person to whom it is addressed, any
such matter or thing.. . shall be fined not more than $ 1,000,000 or
imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both. 44
Some of the language, like the language of statutes generally, is
complex. For example, the statute is one long sentence. In order to
understand it, one must in some sense "know" the following:
1. The subject of the sentence is a clause that begins "whoever,"
and the predicate of the sentence begins with "shall be fined."
2. The subject of the clause that is the sentence's subject is the
word "whoever," along with a clause that modifies that word, and the
predicate of the clause that is the subject of the sentence begins with
"knowingly." The main verb is "causes."
3. The clause beginning "having devised" modifies "whoever"
and is embedded within the clause that is the sentence's subject.
4. The predicate of the clause that is the sentence's subject is
complex, with the phrase "to be delivered by mail" embedded in the
predicate. It is a passive clause, whose subject is missing. Thus, the
sentence does not specify who must do the delivering, just that the
defendant cause the delivery.
5. The clause beginning "having devised" has no subject of its
own, but we interpret "whoever" as its subject.
There are many more complexities in the structure of this lan-
guage, just about all of which make it more difficult to process.45 Yet
once one parses one's way through the statute, just about all of these
relationships among its clauses and phrases fall into place. In fact,
parties and judges routinely argue over the meanings of words in a
statute, but rarely over a statute's syntax.4 6 This is true of the mail
fraud statute as well. One interpretive problem in the mail fraud
44. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2000). This is an abbreviated version of the statute, for purposes of
discussion.
45. For discussion of how syntax and word choice affect the comprehensibility of jury
instructions, see Robert P. Charrow & Veda R. Charrow, Making Legal Language Understand-
able: A Psycholinguistic Study of Jury Instructions, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1306 (1979); see also
AMIRAM ELWORK ET AL., MAKING JURY INSTRUCTIONS UNDERSTANDABLE (1982).
46. See Lawrence M. Solan, Why Laws Work Pretty Well, but Not Great: Words and Rules
in Legal Interpretation, 26 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 243, 245-47 (2001) (reviewing STEVEN
PINKER, WORDS AND RULES: THE INGREDIENTS OF LANGUAGE (1999)) (analyzing cases
decided under the federal bribery statute as being almost exclusively about the meanings of the
statute's words, and not its structure).
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statute does, however, appear to have arisen from syntactic ambigu-
ity. Courts have held, consistent with the language of the statute, that
the statute does not require that the person doing the mailing be the
defendant.47 Any lack of clarity results from the use of the passive
construction without an agent, "causes to be delivered by mail." The
statute does not specify by whom. Otherwise, arguments over the
applicability of this statute are largely over the scope of its various
terms.
How much of the interpretation of the statute should be left to
the jury? If the jury were to decide on a case-by-case basis whether
the defendant has to be the one doing the mailing, it would lead to
inconsistent outcomes in cases with similar facts. Two juries with
different linguistic intuitions could decide differently even if they
both would have acted the same had they understood the statute the
same way. No court would accept this risk of inconsistent verdicts
today. Rather, courts rule as a matter of law in such cases, and
instruct the jury accordingly.
In contrast, interpretation of the statute's terms requires deci-
sions to be made about borderline cases. What counts as a scheme to
defraud? How clear does the defendant's statement have to be to
count as a representation or a promise? These are questions that may
be resolved by courts, but they are the kinds of conceptual questions
that people grapple with every day, and upon which people may differ
as a result of different perspectives and experiences. The issue comes
down to the tension between democratic participation and uniform
treatment.
The conflicting vision of the jury's role as interpreter comes
through both in a leading Supreme Court case interpreting the
statute, and in the various approaches to jury instructions that have
been proposed. In Schmuck v. United States,48 the defendant had
been operating a business in which he would roll back the odometers
of used cars and then sell the cars to dealers who would resell them to
customers at prices inflated to reflect the inaccurately low mileage
resulting from Schmuck's scheme. No mailing was involved until
after the customer bought the car and the dealer used the mail to
register the newly purchased vehicle with the state motor vehicle
department in Wisconsin. The question raised in Schmuck was
47. See, e.g., United States v. Castor, 558 F.2d 379, 385 (7th Cir. 1977).
48. 489 U.S. 705, 707 (1989).
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whether any mailing occurred "for the purpose of executing" a
fraudulent scheme, given that the fraud had been completed before
the mailing occurred.
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction.
The Court held that the trial court had properly denied the defen-
dant's motion to dismiss the indictment. That led to a trial in which
the jury issued a guilty verdict. As for the jurors' role as interpreters
of the statute, the Court held:
Thus, Schmuck's was not a "one-shot" operation in which he sold a
single car to an isolated dealer. His was an ongoing fraudulent ven-
ture. A rational jury could have concluded that the success of
Schmuck's venture depended upon his continued harmonious rela-
tions with, and good reputation among, retail dealers, which in turn
required the smooth flow of cars from the dealers to their Wiscon-
sin customers. 49
The Court's assumption seems correct. It is at least possible to draw
the inference that Schmuck was advantaged by the mailing.
This approach leaves a great deal of discretion to the jury. The
chain of thought that the Court deems "possible" permits the jury to
convict a defendant of allowing others to use the mail for the sake of
facilitating some future fraudulent scheme of which the defendant
was not charged, as Justice Scalia points out forcefully in his dissent.50
At least in principle, jurors are permitted to convict only when the
government has proven the crime for which the defendant was
indicted beyond a reasonable doubt. In contrast, the Court appears
to have left room for a common-law crime of mail fraud.5 '
But not all mail fraud instructions give jurors such broad discre-
tion. For example, many instructions make it clear that, as in
Schmuck, the person using the mail as part of the scheme may be
someone other than the defendant.52 Other instructions explain the
mens rea requirements. For example, in United States v. Lennartz,53
the Seventh Circuit affirmed the use of the "ostrich" or "conscious
avoidance" instruction. The case involved a commercial ambulatory
service that routinely overcharged Medicare for the distances it drove
and for waiting time while patients underwent kidney dialysis. The
49. Id. at711-12.
50. Id. at 723 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
51. See Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Law Crimes, 1994 SuP. CT. REV. 345, 373-78
(arguing that the breadth of some statutes, including the mail fraud statute, leaves so much
judicial discretion as to make them tantamount to common-law crimes).
52. See, e.g., United States v. Voss, 787 F.2d 393, 401 (8th Cir. 1986).
53. 948 F.2d 363 (7th Cir. 1991).
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owner of the company claimed ignorance of the drivers' corrupt
practices, although there was evidence to the contrary. The court
instructed the jury:
When the word "knowingly" is used in these instructions, it means
that the defendant realized what he was doing and was aware of the
nature of the conduct and did not act through ignorance, mistake,
or accident. Knowledge may be proved by the defendant's conduct
and by all the facts and circumstances surrounding the case.
Knowledge may be inferred from a combination of suspicion and
indifference to the truth. If a person is found to have had a strong
suspicion that things were not what they seemed or that someone
had withheld some important facts yet shut his eyes for fear of what
he would learn, that person may be inferred to have acted know-
ingly or with knowledge, as I have used these terms.5 4
Such tugs of war are a typical part of the trial. For almost every issue,
one party will want the jury to be told in no uncertain terms that its
discretion is limited, while the other party will want to rely on the
jury's discretion.
It is instructive in this context to compare two model jury instruc-
tions with radically different approaches. They are set out in the
Appendix. The Federal Judicial Center ("FJC"), the research arm of
the federal judiciary, has opted for a plain-language approach that
summarizes the statute in words that are relatively easy to under-
stand.5  The instruction is 225 words long, and makes certain
tradeoffs between fidelity to the legislature's choice of words and
comprehensibility. It does not mention that the defendant need not
be the one who did the mailing, although that issue is not relevant in
run-of-the-mill mail fraud cases, for which the instruction is designed.
Contrast this instruction with a lengthy one derived from the case
law in various federal circuits, and contained in a practice volume
called Modern Federal Jury Instructions ("MFJI").56 It is more than
2,000 words long, including alternative paths that the instruction
might take depending upon the facts. The shortest version that I
could compile still has more than 1,500 words. It leaves nothing to
chance, except the possibility that the instruction is so long and
complicated that it cannot reasonably serve to inform jurors of the
subtleties that its very structure is intended to convey.
54. Id. at 368-69.
55. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 85 (1987).
56. 2 LEONARD B. SAND ET AL., MODERN FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS §§ 44-4 to -6
(2002).
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Both instructions divide the statute into three elements. While I
will not look closely at all of the language, let us compare how each
instruction handles the first element: that the defendant has devised
"any scheme or artifice to defraud. 5 7 The FJC instruction states this
element succinctly, but deviates from the statutory language:
First, that made a plan [e.g.: to obtain money
based on giving false information about the Apex Corporation to
Sarah Stone and Rubin Ross].58
The instruction has substituted "plan" for "scheme," and instead of
using the word "defraud" describes what the fraud is alleged to be.
Elsewhere the instruction says it is against the law to "cheat" some-
one out of property instead of its being illegal to "devise a plan to
defraud...."
The use of the word "cheat" is especially interesting. Not only is
that word absent from the mail fraud statute, but Congress rarely uses
it at all. I could find only one occurrence in the entire United States
Code-a statute that regulates commodities exchanges makes it a
crime "to cheat or defraud or attempt to cheat or defraud such other
person."5 9 Yet not only do people use it frequently in everyday
speech (beginning at a very young age), but judges often enough use
the word to describe a defendant's conduct or to define fraudulent
behavior.60
I focus on the word "cheat" because we all know it so well that
we are likely to have mental models of prototypical cheating based on
various experiences. This means that the language of the FJC instruc-
tion, by including terms that jurors can relate to their own experience,
may make it easier for them to exercise judgment in determining
whether alleged conduct is actually serious enough to warrant a
conviction. In other words, the language of the instruction invites the
jury to play its traditional part in the adjudication of criminal cases. If
the defendant's conduct does not match all jurors' sense of what it
means to cheat someone, the best the government should be able to
expect is a hung jury.
57. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2000).
58. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 55.
59. 7 U.S.C.A. § 6b(a)(i) (West 1999 & Supp. 2003).
60. For a recent example, see United States v. Thomas, 315 F.3d 190, 200 (3d Cir. 2002)
(quoting State v. Weigel, 477 A.2d 372, 378 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984)) ("In common
parlance, the word 'defraud' means to cheat or wrongfully deprive another of his property by
deception or artifice.").
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The first element in the mail fraud instruction from MFJI, in con-
trast, edited to exclude optional provisions that do not routinely
apply, comes much closer to what a jury is likely to hear:
The first element that the government must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt is that there was a scheme or artifice to defraud
[the victim] of money or property.., by means of false or fraudu-
lent pretenses, representations or promises.
This first element is almost self-explanatory.
A "scheme or artifice" is merely a plan for the accomplish-
ment of an object.
A scheme to defraud is any plan, device, or course of action to
obtain money or property ... by means of false or fraudulent pre-
tenses, representations or promises reasonably calculated to de-
ceive persons of average prudence.
"Fraud" is a general term which embraces all the various
means by which human ingenuity can devise and which are resorted
to by an individual to gain an advantage over another by false rep-
resentations, suggestions or suppression of the truth, or deliberate
disregard for the truth.
Thus, a "scheme to defraud" is merely a plan to deprive an-
other of money or property ... by trick, deceit, deception or swin-
dle.
The scheme to defraud is alleged to have been carried out by
making false (or fraudulent) statements (representations) (claims)
(documents).
A statement, representation, claim or document is false if it is
untrue when made and was then known to be untrue by the person
making it or causing it to be made.
A representation or statement is fraudulent if it was falsely
made with the intention to deceive.
Deceitful statements of half truths or the concealment of mate-
rial facts, and the expression of an opinion not honestly entertained
may also constitute false or fraudulent statements under the statute.
The deception need not be premised upon spoken or written
words alone. The arrangement of the words, or the circumstances in
which they are used may convey the false and deceptive appear-
ance. If there is deception, the manner in which it is accomplished is
immaterial....
The false or fraudulent representation (or failure to disclose)
must relate to a material fact or matter. A material fact is one
which would reasonably be expected to be of concern to a reason-
able and prudent person in relying upon the representation or
statement in making a decision (e.g., with respect to a proposed in-
vestment).
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This means that if you find a particular statement of fact to
have been false, you must determine whether that statement was
one that a reasonable person or investor might have considered im-
portant in making his or her decision. The same principle applies to
fraudulent half truths or omissions of material facts....
In addition to proving that a statement was false or fraudulent
and related to a material fact, in order to establish a scheme to de-
fraud, the government must prove that the alleged scheme contem-
plated depriving another of money or property (or of the intangible
right of honest services).
However, the government is not required to prove that the de-
fendant himself originated the scheme to defraud. Furthermore, it
is not necessary that the government prove that the defendant ac-
tually realized any gain from the scheme or that the intended victim
actually suffered any loss....
A scheme to defraud need not be shown by direct evidence,
but may be established by all of the circumstances and facts in the
case .... 61
In actual cases, an instruction of this sort will be tailored to the facts
of the particular case. Nonetheless, it contains some typical features
that reflect the legal system's longstanding concerns about the jury
system. Putting to one side the almost entertaining remark, "This
first element is almost self-explanatory," the instruction actually uses
more or less the same language of the shorter FJC instruction. It
explains: "Thus, a 'scheme to defraud' is merely a plan to deprive
another of money or property ... by trick, deceit, deception or
swindle."
Nonetheless, the MFJI instruction attempts to keep the jurors'
analysis of the case under tight control to assure that different defen-
dants accused of committing the same crime will be treated more or
less the same, and in accordance with established legal principles.
Definitions of the elements of the crime that result from various
judicial decisions make their way into the instructions. As the corpus
of published opinions expands, so do the instructions that the jury
must digest. Uniformity of treatment is what motivated the reduction
of the jury's law-finding function in the nineteenth century. 62 More
than a hundred years later, it has resulted in complex, linguistically
loyal instructions that are difficult to understand. What they give
lawyers and trial judges is the peace of mind that comes with defer-
61. 2 SAND ET AL., supra note 56, §§ 44-3 to -6.
62. See Harrington, supra note 2, at 380.
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ence to the legislature and appellate judges put in charge of enacting
and clarifying the criminal law.
Taken together, the two mail fraud instructions illustrate the
endpoints of the different perceptions of the modern American
criminal jury. The FJC instruction treats the jury as an institution
whose job it is to exercise its judgment wisely once it is introduced to
the governing legal principles. It says little about the law in the
abstract, opting instead to describe as illegal the facts as the govern-
ment alleges them. The MFJI instruction does just opposite.
B. Money Laundering: Legislative Control of Jury Deliberations
The focus of this Article has thus far been on how courts control
the scope of jury deliberations, whether by deciding issues as a matter
of law, or by presenting jurors with instructions designed to minimize
their discretion in reaching a verdict. Courts are an appropriate
institution to investigate because it is the trial court that decides
which instructions to present, and because it is the appellate courts
that decide whether the instruction fairly presents jurors with a
description of the law. But the analysis should begin before the
courts get involved. The starting point should really be the legisla-
ture, and its decision to draft laws that are likely to lead to one vision
of the jury versus another. In both criminal and regulatory legisla-
tion, statutes are becoming longer and more complex. Whether the
result of negotiation and compromise,63 or a statement to judges and
juries that they are not to be trusted,64 Congress in particular has been
leaving less and less to the discretion of others, especially in the realm
of the criminal law. The mail fraud statute may give courts some
room to determine the wording, length, and tone of the instruction.
But long, complicated statutes, as a practical matter, do not. Consider
the federal money laundering statute,65 presented below in relevant
part:
§ 1956. Laundering of monetary instruments
(a)(1) Whoever, knowing that the property involved in a financial
transaction represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activ-
63. This position is consistent with the public choice model of legislation. See generally
DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL
INTRODUC'ITON (1991).
64. Consider for example the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A (2001).
65. 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (2000).
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ity, conducts or attempts to conduct such a financial transaction
which in fact involves the proceeds of specified unlawful activity-
(A) (i) with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified
unlawful activity; or
(ii) with intent to engage in conduct constituting a violation of
section 7201 or 7206 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986; or
(B) knowing that the transaction is designed in whole or in part-
(i) to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source,
the ownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified
unlawful activity; or
(ii) to avoid a transaction reporting requirement under State
or Federal law,
shall be sentenced to a fine of not more than $ 500,000 or twice the
value of the property involved in the transaction, whichever is
greater, or imprisonment for not more than twenty years, or both. 6
The syntax of the statute is rather convoluted, but the elements
of the crime are clear. To commit the crime of money laundering the
defendant must: (1) conduct or attempt to conduct a financial transac-
tion, (2) knowing that the property involved represents the proceeds
of some form of unlawful activity, (3) with the intent to promote the
carrying on of the unlawful activity. In addition, like many statutes,
this one contains a set of statutory definitions. 67 Legal scholars are
accustomed to reading (and sometimes criticizing) such definitions.
But lay people are not. How should a jury be instructed when the
legislature has taken the care to define statutory terms, but has done
so in language that is very difficult to understand? Consider the
following example. The statute is entitled "Laundering of monetary
instruments." Jurors are not likely to be familiar with that term. This
might give a court the opportunity to define the term in everyday
language that jurors might understand. For example, let us say that
the defendant is accused of laundering cash and personal checks. A
court may say something like: "The statute makes it a crime to
launder 'monetary instruments.' You may not be familiar with that
term. For our purposes, it includes cash and personal checks." But
Congress defines the term in the statute:
(5) the term "monetary instruments" means (i) coin or currency of
the United States or of any other country, travelers' checks, per-
sonal checks, bank checks, and money orders, or (ii) investment
66. Id. § 1956(a)(1).
67. Id. § 1956(c).
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securities or negotiable instruments, in bearer form or otherwise in
such form that title thereto passes upon delivery .... 6
This definition is largely irrelevant, and not easy to understand
because it contains the names of instruments with which many jurors
are likely to be unfamiliar. Hearing it may confuse some jurors and
cause others to stop listening carefully because the language can be
alienating. But to instruct the jury on only the potentially applicable
portions of this section misses an important point that Congress wrote
into the statute: the definition of "monetary instruments" is written
broadly, in order to catch as many such instruments as possible.
Unless the judge reads the definition, the jury will not be made privy
to that fact, but if the judge reads it, the language is likely to be
confusing.
Standard jury instructions resolve this problem with a compro-
mise. The judge gives a number of examples, but leaves out the
exotic ones:
The term "monetary instrument" includes, among other things,
coin or currency of the United States or any other country, personal
checks, traveler's checks, cashier's checks, bank checks, money or-
ders, and investment securities or negotiable instruments in bearer
form or otherwise in such form that title thereto passes upon deliv-
ery.69
This strikes me as a perfectly reasonable jury instruction. But it is a
far cry from the FJC's approach to instructing the jury on mail fraud.
The top-down approach to jury instruction has won. The structure of
the statute makes it difficult to do otherwise.
For other terms, the instructions succumb completely to the lan-
guage of the statute, making the terms very difficult to understand.
Consider, for example, the MFJI instruction that defines "financial
transaction":
The term "financial transaction" means a transaction involving
a financial institution which is engaged in, or the activities of which
affect, interstate or foreign commerce in any way or degree, or a
transaction which in any way or degree affects interstate or foreign
commerce and involves the movement of funds by wire or other
means, or involves one or more monetary instruments, or involves
the transfer of title to any real property, vehicle, vessel or aircraft.70
This language closely tracks the language of the statute:
68. Id. § 1956(c)(5).
69. 3 SAND ET AL., supra note 56, § 50A-3.
70. Id.
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(4) the term "financial transaction" means (A) a transaction which
in any way or degree affects interstate or foreign commerce (i) in-
volving the movement of funds by wire or other means or (ii) in-
volving one or more monetary instruments, or (iii) involving the
transfer of title to any real property, vehicle, vessel, or aircraft, or
(B) a transaction involving the use of a financial institution which is
engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign
commerce in any way or degree .... 71
When the statute's glossary does not define a term but the instruction
does, the instruction is written more comprehensibly. Consider the
following definition taken from the MFJI instruction: "Proceeds can
be any kind of property, not just money."" This shows that the
drafters of these instructions are capable of writing in plain English
when the opportunity presents itself.
C. Mixed Loyalties: The Text Usually Wins
Most often, jury instructions based on particular criminal statutes
simply track the language of the statute. However, this is not always
so. The Supreme Court reversed a death sentence because the trial
court allowed the jury to rely only on the language of a statute
without further guidance. In Godfrey v. Georgia,73 the defendant was
sentenced to death under a Georgia statute that permitted the jury to
impose the death penalty for a murder that "was outrageously or
wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, deprav-
ity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim. 74 The instruction
to the jury was the statute itself, without further explanation. The
Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the death sentence, but the
Supreme Court of the United States reversed. Even though the
Georgia death penalty statute had been found constitutional, and
even though the instruction tracked the language of the statute, the
Court found that the instruction gave the jury no guidance:
In the case before us, the Georgia Supreme Court has affirmed
a sentence of death based upon no more than a finding that the of-
fense was "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman."
There is nothing in these few words, standing alone, that implies
any inherent restraint on the arbitrary and capricious infliction of
the death sentence. A person of ordinary sensibility could fairly
characterize almost every murder as "outrageously or wantonly
71. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(4).
72. 3 SAND ET AL., supra note 56, § 50A-3.
73. 446 U.S. 420 (1980).
74. Id. at 422 (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1(b)(7) (1978)).
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vile, horrible and inhuman." Such a view may, in fact, have been
one to which the members of the jury in this case subscribed. If so,
their preconceptions were not dispelled by the trial judge's sentenc-
ing instructions. These gave the jury no guidance concerning the
meaning of any of § (b)(7)'s terms. In fact, the jury's interpretation
of § (b)(7) can only be the subject of sheer speculation.75
In recent years the Court has had a mixed record in deciding whether
to strike down unclear jury instructions in death penalty cases.76 Yet
Godfrey remains a good illustration of one approach to the relation-
ship between jury instructions and a statute's words: the instruction
must be loyal to the meaning of the statute; however, if the statutory
language is either hard to understand or is simply too vague to be of
much help, the instruction must go beyond the words of the statute
itself.
Courts sometimes recognize the need for clarification of statu-
tory language simply as a matter of sound judicial management.
Consider, for example, State v. Alexander,77 a case decided by the
Supreme Court of New Jersey in 1994. The defendant was accused of
violating various drug laws, including New Jersey's "drug kingpin"
statute. Alexander had hired another individual named Harewood to
sell crack cocaine to Alexander's customers. Alexander would supply
Harewood with cocaine. Harewood would sell the cocaine and
collect the money. Alexander would then get 70% of the receipts;
Harewood got the other 30%.78 Below is the relevant part of the drug
kingpin statute:
A person is a leader of a narcotics trafficking network if he con-
spires with others as an organizer, supervisor, financier or manager,
to engage for profit in a scheme or course of conduct to unlawfully
manufacture, distribute, dispense, bring into or transport in this
State methamphetamine, lysergic acid diethylamide, phencyclidine
or any controlled dangerous substance classified in Schedule I or II,
or any controlled substance analog thereof. Leader of narcotics
trafficking network is a crime of the first degree and upon convic-
tion thereof.., a person shall be sentenced to an ordinary term of
75. Id. at 428-29.
76. Compare Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 227 (2000) (even when jurors claim not to
have understood a term in an instruction, courts are under no obligation to offer a meaningful
explanation.), with Kelly v. South Carolina, 534 U.S. 246 (2002) (most recent in a series of cases
holding that jurors must be informed when life without parole is the only alternative to death
penalty and government puts defendant's future dangerousness into issue). See generally, Peter
M. Tiersma, Dictionaries and Death: Do Capital Jurors Understand Mitigation, 1995 UTAH L.
REV. 1.
77. 643 A.2d 996 (N.J. 1994).
78. Id. at 997.
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life imprisonment during which the person must serve 25 years be-
fore being eligible for parole.
79
Its language is opaque at best, even though the Supreme Court of
New Jersey had earlier held that it survived attack for being unconsti-
tutionally vague.8° Affirming a decision of an intermediate appellate
court,81 the New Jersey Supreme Court in Alexander held that expla-
nation of the statutory terms was required. It held that the trial court
should instruct the jury that it must find that the defendant occu-
pies a high-level position, that is, a position of superior authority
or control over other persons, in a scheme or organization of drug
distribution (or manufacture or dispensing or transporting), and
that in that position the defendant exercised supervisory power or
control over others engaged in an organized drug-trafficking net-
work.82
This additional language was needed, the court explained, to make
the instruction consistent with the purpose of the statute, which was
set forth in a statement of purpose that was part of the statute itself.
Moreover, the court explained:
This Court has made abundantly clear that correct jury instructions
are at the heart of the proper execution of the jury function in a
criminal trial: "'[aippropriate and proper charges to a jury are es-
sential for a fair trial."' A court's obligation properly to instruct and
to guide a jury includes the duty to clarify statutory language that
prescribes the elements of a crime when clarification is essential to
ensure that the jury will fully understand and actually find those
elements in determining the defendant's guilt.
For the purpose of instructing and guiding juries, courts regularly
explain and define statutory language consistent with legislative
intent. Courts commonly clarify statutory language to give more
precise meaning to statutory terms to effect the legislative intent
and to make sure that juries carry out that intent in determining
criminal culpability.8 3
Thus, at least in New Jersey, courts sometimes take seriously the role
of the juror as statutory interpreter and provide jurors with the kind
of explanatory material that judges themselves use when they per-
form that task.
For the most part, though, courts do not reverse convictions
when the instructions tracked the language of the statute. As the
Eighth Circuit recently put it: "The best way to comply with [the
79. Id. at 998 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-3 (West 1987)).
80. State v. Afanador, 631 A.2d 946, 950 (N.J. 1993).
81. State v. Alexander, 624 A.2d 48 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993).
82. Alexander, 643 A.2d at 1000.
83. Id. (citations omitted).
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Federal Death Penalty Act] is to actually use the language of the
statute in the jury instruction."8 Thus, statutory language can offer a
safe harbor for trial courts concerned about being reversed, just as
statutory language provides a safe harbor for prosecutors who draft
indictments.
State courts typically also approve instructions that track a stat-
ute's exact words, regardless of how comprehensible they are. A
Minnesota statute says: "No employer or agent thereof shall directly
or indirectly solicit or require a polygraph, voice stress analysis, or
any test purporting to test the honesty of any employee or prospec-
tive employee." 5 At a trial over an employer's use of a polygraph,
the Supreme Court of Minnesota approved the trial court's refusal to
define "solicit," since the trial court "used the exact words of the
statute. '86 This does not mean that the exact words are required.
They are not. The Supreme Court of Hawaii has made it clear that
the "trial court is not required to instruct the jury in the exact words
of the applicable statute but to present the jury with an understand-
able instruction that aids the jury in applying that law to the facts of
the case."87 But using a statute's exact words generally creates a safe
harbor for trial judges. 88 It is rare to find a reversal, whether or not
the language of the statute used in the instruction is comprehensible
to the average person.
The legal system is thus of two minds when it comes to letting
the jury rely on the exact words of a statute. Sometimes the system is
satisfied with a "read the statute and run" approach to the jury. At
other times, it takes the role of the jury seriously in deciding whether
the exact words are the best words.
In contrast, although "[a] defendant is entitled to an instruction
on his theory of the case if the instruction is a correct statement of the
law and if he has offered sufficient evidence for the jury to find in his
84. United States v. Paul, 217 F.3d 989. 997 (8th Cir. 2000); see also Harjo v. Gibson, No.
99-7041, 2000 WL 796091, at *4 (10th Cir. June 21, 2000) ("Instructing the jury according to the
statutory language of the aggravator, as the trial court did, meets constitutional standards.");
Farrington v. Senkowski, 214 F.3d 237, 244 (2d Cir. 2000) ("These instructions on larceny mirror
the statutory language, and were therefore not 'clearly constitutionally deficient."' (citations
omitted)).
85. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.75(1) (West 1993).
86. Kamrath v. Suburban Nat'l Bank, 363 N.W.2d 108, 111 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
87. State v. Apao, 586 P.2d 250, 263 (Haw. 1978); see also State v. Barbour, 258 S.E.2d 475,
481 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979).
88. See, e.g., State v. Booth, 276 N.W.2d 673, 677-78 (Neb. 1979).
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favor," 89 defendants are not entitled to have the judge read the exact
language of the instruction they suggest.9° As long as the judge
"substantially covered the point that [the defendant] sought to get
across," the instruction will be affirmed on appeal.9'
The point of these cases is clear enough to trial judges: you will
rarely get into trouble if you explain a statute to jurors by reading its
language to them. We are willing, for the most part, to accept the
legal fiction that jurors understand what they are told, even when we
know they do not. In fact, it is a nearly unrebuttable principle of law
that jurors do understand the instructions that are read to them. As
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote in deciding that it was proper for a trial
judge simply to repeat an instruction in a death penalty case that
jurors said they did not understand:
A jury is presumed to follow its instructions. Similarly, a jury is
presumed to understand a judge's answer to its question. Weeks'
jury did not inform the court that after reading the relevant para-
graph of the instruction, it still did not understand its role. To pre-
sume otherwise would require reversal every time a jury inquires
about a matter of constitutional significance, regardless of thejudge's answer. 92
A jury wishing to be better instructed must state its failure to under-
stand and then argue with the judge about his solution in order to be
heard. It is not realistic to expect this to happen. Thus, not only does
the opinion accept the legal fiction, it works to keep juror compre-
hension fictional.
III. CONCLUSION: COMMUNAL JUSTICE AND STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION
In their important studies, Paul Robinson and John Darley com-
pare a set of criminal-law doctrines with the views of individuals
89. See, e.g., United States v. Dozal, 173 F.3d 787, 796 (10th Cir. 1999) (quoting United
States v. McIntosh, 124 F.3d 1330, 1337 (10th Cir. 1997)) (internal quotations omitted).
90. Id.
91. United States v. Smith, No. 93-5953, 1994 WL 162584, at *5 (6th Cir. Apr. 28, 1994); see
also Riverwoods Chappaqua Corp. v. Marine Midland Bank, N.A., 30 F.3d 339, 346 (2d Cir.
1994) ("The district court is not obligated to charge the jury using the exact words proposed by
a party .... While a more specific instruction might have been helpful, there is no basis for
concluding that the jury was given a misleading or inaccurate impression of the law.").
92. Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225,234 (2000) (citations omitted). For discussion of the
Court's dismissive attitude toward juror understanding, see Peter Tiersma, The Rocky Road to
Legal Reform: Improving the Language of Jury Instructions, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 1081, 1085-89(2001).
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concerning crime and punishment.93 They find that "often the legal
codes and the community standards reflect similar rules in assigning
liability to a case of wrongdoing; but also often they do not. ' 94 In the
introductory chapter, they argue that this comparison is important:
[R]ecent empirical evidence suggests that criminal law's most effec-
tive mechanism of compliance is not the deterrent threat of sanc-
tion; it is its capacity to authoritatively describe the moral and
proper rules of conduct. People will follow those rules not because
they fear punishment for violating them but because they see them-
selves as good and law-abiding people who are inclined to obey the
law because it is the right thing to do. Most important, the compli-
ance power of criminal law is directly proportional to its moral
credibility. If the criminal law is seen as unjust in one instance, its
moral credibility and its concomitant compliance power are, ac-
cordingly, incrementally reduced. 95
Robinson and Darley focus their attention on particular legal
doctrines that do not match community standards of justice. To the
extent that they are correct that this gap diminishes the moral force of
the law, one solution is to change the doctrines, which requires
legislative action. This solution, however, is not accomplished easily.
Consider, for example, California's "three strikes" law that calls
for a sentence of twenty-five years to life for a third offense.96 The
Supreme Court has ruled that the statute does not violate the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment in a 2003
case involving a series of three thefts over a period of years. The last
theft, which triggered the statute's application, was of three golf
clubs.97 A companion case involved a similar sentence, where the
triggering crime was the theft of videotapes from two department
stores. 98 The Court based its decision in large part on its "traditional
deference to legislative policy choices" in determining how long a
sentence to impose. 99
The application of the three strikes statute in such circumstances
may well offend some people's sense of justice. Many would consider
a sentence of up to life in prison for shoplifting extreme, no matter
what illegal acts a person had committed years earlier. The vigorous
93. PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY & BLAME:
COMMUNITY VIEWS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1995).
94. Id. at 2.
95. Id. at 6 (citing TOM TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990)) (citation omitted).
96. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(e)(2)(A) (West 1999).
97. Ewing v. California, 123 S. Ct. 1179, 1183 (2003).
98. Lockyer v. Andrade, 123 S. Ct. 1166, 1169-70 (2003).
99. Ewing, 123 S. Ct. at 1187 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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dissent of four justices certainly demonstrated that there is no consen-
sus that the law as applied in such cases even meets the most minimal
standards of proportionality that constitutional doctrine requires.1°°
But the law is not likely to be repealed, leaving neither the legislature
nor the courts to protect against prosecutions that are more aggres-
sive than community values would permit.
A second approach to the gap between statutory law and com-
munity standards of justice is to embed into the system procedures
that diminish the likelihood that people will actually be convicted for
conduct that is not deemed by the community to be antisocial, or at
least not as antisocial as the law would have it. As Marder points out,
juries in some California counties are unlikely to convict an individual
of an offense that will trigger the three strikes law if the jury believes
the application of that law to a particular case is unjust.11 This
reluctance, in turn, affects decisions to prosecute. 12 By reducing the
rate of conviction for prosecutions that would result in disproportion-
ate punishment, juries, at least in some counties, are limiting the
statute's application to the kinds of cases that led to the statute's
enactment in the first place. Prosecutions for violations that stray too
far from the prototype are less likely to be successful, consistent with
the experimental literature discussed earlier in this Article. 103 There-
fore, they are less likely to occur at all, since prosecutors' offices have
no reason to waste their resources.
Examples like these have led commentators to look favorably on
the role that juries play in such cases. But they do not fully address
the larger questions about the proper role of jurors as statutory
interpreters. To see why, let us return to Mr. Schmuck, who was
convicted of mail fraud.1°3 The applicability of the statute to the facts
of the case was questionable. Yet the jury convicted. In other cases,
courts have reversed convictions by applying the rule of lenity and
ruling that a prosecution was improper.05 There are thus instances in
which the community values expressed by jurors lead to conviction
100. Id. at 1193-1207 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
101. See Marder, supra note 10, at 895-99; Nancy S. Marder, Juries, Drug Laws & Sentenc-
ing, 6 J. GENDER, RACE & JUSTICE 337, 341-52 (2002).
102. Marder, supra note 10, at 897. Kixmiller, supra note 14, also makes this point.
103. See Smith, supra note 12.
104. Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705 (1989).
105. For examples that deal largely with linguistic issues in such cases, see Lawrence M.
Solan, Law, Language and Lenity, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 57 (1998).
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when the language of the statute does not apply, at least not clearly
SO.
One way to handle this problem is by giving the jurors greater
discretion, but instructing them accordingly. In another article,
Darryl Brown has suggested that when disputes arise over the word-
ing of jury instructions, and both versions are acceptable as a matter
of law, principles of lenity dictate that the judge should give the
defendant the benefit of the doubt and read his proposed instruc-
tion.106 Brown's proposal, while well-intentioned, is not likely to win
over many courts. For one thing, not all defense-proposed instruc-
tions are the most faithful to the overall meaning of the statute, even
if they are legally acceptable. Courts will want to continue to make
that analysis.
My proposal is a more modest one. Courts should continue to
permit jurors to interpret statutes to allow their verdicts to reflect the
standards of the community. This process was originally contem-
plated as a unidirectional filter, and should remain so. Thus, courts
should continue applying such canons as the absurd result rule and
the ordinary meaning rule to weed out cases that appear to exceed
the intended scope of a statute. If a case survives that level of scru-
tiny and makes its way to the jury, a defendant will have yet another
chance for acquittal if the prosecution is more aggressive than the
ordinary meaning and the jury's sense of decency permit. Whenever
possible, instructions should be drafted so that they do not undermine
the jury's ability to exercise this level of discretion.
Providing even this much role for the jury is controversial, at
least in some instances. Returning to California's three strikes law,
certain procedures make it harder for jurors to bring community
values into their deliberations. California law permits bifurcated
trials in three strikes cases.107 First a jury determines guilt or inno-
cence on the crime that constitutes the third strike. Then that same
jury determines whether the defendant was earlier convicted of other
crimes that make up the first two strikes.108 The court pronounces
sentence based on these verdicts. The procedure is consistent with
106. Darryl K. Brown, Regulating Decision Effects of Legally Sufficient Jury Instructions,
73 S. CAL. L. REV. 1105, 1124 (2000).
107. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1025, 1044; see People v. Cline, 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 41 (Cal. App.
1998) (holding it proper for court to grant prosecutor's motion for bifurcation in three strikes
case).
108. See People v. Tindall, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 533, 536 (2000) (holding that same jury must
decide both issues).
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the general notion that jurors are not supposed to take sentencing
considerations into account in deciding guilt or innocence.'09
The function of this bifurcation, of course, is to reduce the
chances that jurors know that they are sitting in a three strikes case
during the first phase of the trial, so that they will not apply commu-
nity values of lenity and proportionality to the decision-making
process. Judges and prosecutors will not always succeed in keeping
from the jury the fact that they are sitting on a three strikes case. 110
Yet the goal is clear enough, and it is very much at odds with the
traditional role of the jury as a mechanism to filter excessively harsh
prosecutions.
Despite such examples, even in an era seemingly far removed
from one in which the jury was the finder of the law as well as the
finder of fact, jurors can continue to play a positive role in determin-
ing the applicability of statutory law. To the extent that their contri-
bution to the judicial process helps to narrow the gap between the
community's views of justice and the outer reaches of the law, things
have not changed much in over 200 years.
109. People v. Nichols, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 433, 434 (Cal. App. 1997); see Marder, supra note
101, at 345.
110. See Marder, supra note 101, at 346-47.
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APPENDIX: TWO MAIL FRAUD JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Federal Judicial Center
The defendant, , is accused of [e.g.: planning to
get money by giving false information to Sarah Stone and Rubin
Ross] and using the mail in connection with this plan. It is against
federal law to cheat someone if the mail is used. For you to find
guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that
the government has proved each of these things beyond a reason-
able doubt:
First, that made a plan [e.g.: to obtain money
based on giving false information about the Apex Corporation to
Sarah Stone and Rubin Ross].
Second, that when made the plan, he knew the
information he was giving was false.
Third, that mailed something (caused another
person to mail something) for the purpose of carrying out this plan.
It does not matter whether this plan succeeded, or whether
made money from this plan. Nor does it matter
whether the false information was contained in the material that
was mailed. However, for you to decide that is
guilty, you must find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
made this plan intending to deceive [Stone and
Ross] and to make money from the plan and that the mail was used
to carry out the plan. Each separate use of the mail during the car-
rying out of a scheme to defraud is a separate offense."'
Modern Federal Jury Instructions
In order to sustain this charge, the government must prove each of
the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
First, that there was a scheme or artifice to defraud or to obtain
money or property (if applicable: or the intangible right of honest
services) by materially false and fraudulent pretenses, representa-
tions or promises, as alleged in the indictment;
Second, that the defendant knowingly and willfully participated in
the scheme or artifice to defraud, with knowledge of its fraudulent
111. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 55.
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nature and with specific intent to defraud (if applicable: or that he
knowingly and intentionally aided and abetted others in the
scheme); and
Third, that in execution of that scheme, the defendant used or
caused the use of the mails (or a private or commercial interstate
carrier or interstate wires) as specified in the indictment.
The first element that the government must prove beyond a rea-
sonable doubt is that there was a scheme or artifice to defraud [the
victim] of money or property (if applicable: or the intangible right
of honest services) by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, repre-
sentations or promises.
This first element is almost self-explanatory.
A "scheme or artifice" is merely a plan for the accomplishment of
an object.
A scheme to defraud is any plan, device, or course of action to ob-
tain money or property (or the intangible right of honest services)
by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations or prom-
ises reasonably calculated to deceive persons of average prudence.
"Fraud" is a general term which embraces all the various means by
which human ingenuity can devise and which are resorted to by an
individual to gain an advantage over another by false representa-
tions, suggestions or suppression of the truth, or deliberate disre-
gard for the truth.
Thus, a "scheme to defraud" is merely a plan to deprive another of
money or property (or of the intangible right to honest services) by
trick, deceit, deception or swindle.
The scheme to defraud is alleged to have been carried out by mak-
ing false (or fraudulent) statements (representa-
tions) (claims) (documents).
A statement, representation, claim or document is false if it is un-
true when made and was then known to be untrue by the person
making it or causing it to be made.
A representation or statement is fraudulent if it was falsely made
with the intention to deceive.
Deceitful statements of half truths or the concealment of material
facts, and the expression of an opinion not honestly entertained
may also constitute false or fraudulent statements under the statute.
The deception need not be premised upon spoken or written words
alone. The arrangement of the words, or the circumstances in which
they are used may convey the false and deceptive appearance. If
there is deception, the manner in which it is accomplished is imma-
terial.
(If applicable: The failure to disclose information may also consti-
tute a fraudulent representation if the defendant was under a legal,
professional or contractual duty to make such a disclosure, the de-
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fendant actually knew such disclosure ought to be made, and the
defendant failed to make such disclosure with the intent to de-
fraud.)
The false or fraudulent representation (or failure to disclose) must
relate to a material fact or matter. A material fact is one which
would reasonably be expected to be of concern to a reasonable and
prudent person in relying upon the representation or statement in
making a decision (e.g., with respect to a proposed investment).
This means that if you find a particular statement of fact to have
been false, you must determine whether that statement was one
that a reasonable person or investor might have considered impor-
tant in making his or her decision. The same principle applies to
fraudulent half truths or omissions of material facts.
(If applicable: The representations which the government charges
were made as part of the scheme to defraud are set forth in para-
graph-of the indictment, which I have already read to you. It is
not required that every misrepresentation charged in the indict-
ment be proved. It is sufficient if the prosecution proves beyond a
reasonable doubt that one or more of the alleged material misrep-
resentations were made in furtherance of the alleged scheme to de-
fraud.)
In addition to proving that a statement was false or fraudulent and
related to a material fact, in order to establish a scheme to defraud,
the government must prove that the alleged scheme contemplated
depriving another of money or property (or of the intangible right
of honest services).
However, the government is not required to prove that the defen-
dant himself originated the scheme to defraud. Furthermore, it is
not necessary that the government prove that the defendant actu-
ally realized any gain from the scheme or that the intended victim
actually suffered any loss. (If applicable: In this case, it so happens
that the government does contend that the proof establishes that
persons were defrauded and that the defendant profited. Although
whether or not the scheme actually succeeded is really not the
question, you may consider whether it succeeded in determining
whether the scheme existed.)
A scheme to defraud need not be shown by direct evidence, but
may be established by all of the circumstances and facts in the case.
If you find that the government has sustained its burden of proof
that a scheme to defraud, as charged, did exist, you next should
consider the second element.
The second element that the government must prove beyond a rea-
sonable doubt is that the defendant participated in the scheme to
defraud knowingly, willfully and with specific intent to defraud.
"Knowingly" means to act voluntarily and deliberately, rather than
mistakenly or inadvertently.
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"Willfully" means to act knowingly and purposely, with an intent to
do something the law forbids; that is to say, with bad purpose either
to disobey or to disregard the law.
"Intent to defraud" means to act knowingly and with the specific
intent to deceive, for the purpose of causing some financial or prop-
erty loss to another (if applicable: or of depriving another of the
intangible right of honest services).
The question of whether a person acted knowingly, willfully and
with intent to defraud is a question of fact for you to determine,
like any other fact question. This question involves one's state of
mind.
Direct proof of knowledge and fraudulent intent is almost never
available. It would be a rare case where it could be shown that a
person wrote or stated that as of a given time in the past he com-
mitted an act with fraudulent intent. Such direct proof is not re-
quired.
The ultimate facts of knowledge and criminal intent, though subjec-
tive, may be established by circumstantial evidence, based upon a
person's outward manifestations, his words, his conduct, his acts
and all the surrounding circumstances disclosed by the evidence
and the rational or logical inferences that may be drawn from them.
Circumstantial evidence, if believed, is of no less value than direct
evidence. In either case, the essential elements of the crime must be
established beyond a reasonable doubt.
Since an essential element of the crime charged is intent to defraud,
it follows that good faith on the part of the defendant is a complete
defense to a charge of mail (or wire) fraud. A defendant, however,
has no burden to establish a defense of good faith. The burden is on
the government to prove fraudulent intent and the consequent lack
of good faith beyond a reasonable doubt.
Under the mail fraud statute, even false representations or state-
ments, or omissions of material facts, do not amount to a fraud
unless done with fraudulent intent. However misleading or decep-
tive a plan may be, it is not fraudulent if it was devised or carried
out in good faith. An honest belief in the truth of the representa-
tions made by a defendant is a good defense, however inaccurate
the statements may turn out to be.
(If applicable: There is another consideration to bear in mind in de-
ciding whether or not defendant acted in good faith. You are in-
structed that if the defendant participated in the scheme to defraud,
then a belief by the defendant, if such belief existed, that ultimately
everything would work out so that no one would lose any money
does not require a finding by you that the defendant acted in good
faith. If the defendant participated in the scheme for the purpose of
causing some financial or property loss to another, then no amount
of honest belief on the part of the defendant that the scheme would
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(e.g., ultimately make a profit for the investors) will excuse fraudu-
lent actions or false representations by him.)
As a practical matter, then, in order to sustain the charges against
the defendant, the government must establish beyond a reasonable
doubt that he knew that his conduct as a participant in the scheme
was calculated to deceive and, nonetheless, he associated himself
with the alleged fraudulent scheme for the purpose of causing some
loss to another.
(If applicable: The government can also meet its burden of showing
that the defendant had knowledge of the falsity of the statements if
it establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that he acted with deliber-
ate disregard of whether the statements were true or false, or with a
conscious purpose to avoid learning the truth. If the government
establishes that the defendant acted with deliberate disregard for
the truth, the knowledge requirement would be satisfied unless the
defendant actually believed the statements to be true. This guilty,
knowledge, however, cannot be established by demonstrating that
the defendant was merely negligent or foolish.)
To conclude on this element, if you find that the defendant was not
a knowing participant in the scheme or that he lacked the specific
intent to defraud, you should acquit him. On the other hand, if you
find that the government has established beyond a reasonable
doubt not only the first element, namely the existence of the
scheme to defraud, but also this second element, that the defendant
was a knowing participant and acted with specific intent to defraud,
and if the government also establishes the third element, as to
which I am about to instruct you, then you have a sufficient basis
upon which to convict the defendant.
The third and final element that the government must establish be-
yond a reasonable doubt is the use of the mails in furtherance of
the scheme to defraud. (For conduct occurring after September 13,
1994, add: The use of the mails as I have used it here includes mate-
rial sent through either the United States Postal Service or a private
or commercial interstate carrier.)
The mailed matter need not contain a fraudulent representation or
purpose or request for money. It must, however, further or assist in
the carrying out of the scheme to defraud.
It is not necessary for the defendant to be directly or personally in-
volved in the mailing, as long as the mailing was reasonably fore-
seeable in the execution of the alleged scheme to defraud in which
the defendant is accused of participating.
In this regard, it is sufficient to establish this element of the crime if
the evidence justifies a finding that the defendant caused the mail-
ing by others. This does not mean that the defendant must specifi-
cally have authorized others to do the mailing. When one does an
act with knowledge that the use of the mails will follow in the ordi-
nary course of business or where such use of the mails can reasona-
bly be foreseen, even though not actually intended, then he causes
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the mails to be used. (If applicable: The government contends that
it was reasonably foreseeable that the mails would be used in the
ordinary course of business (e.g., to send confirmations of pur-
chases), and therefore that the defendant caused the mailings.
With respect to the use of the mails, the government must establish
beyond a reasonable doubt the particular mailing charged in the
indictment. However, the government does not have to prove that
the mailings were made on the exact date charged in the indict-
ment. It is sufficient if the evidence establishes beyond a reasonable
doubt that the mailing was made on a date substantially similar to
the date charged in the indictment. 112
112. 2 SAND ETAL., supra note 56, §§ 44-3 to -6.
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